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Abstract Vilém Flusser, philosopher of communication, and Luciano Floridi, philosopher of 
information  have  been  engaged  with  common  subjects,  extracting  surprisingly  similar 
conclusions  in  distant  ages,  affecting  distant  audiences.  Curiously,  despite  the  common 
characteristics,  their  works  have  almost  never  been  used  together.  This  paper  presents 
Flusser’s  concepts  of  functionaries,  informational  environment,  information  recycle,  and 
posthistory as  mellontological  hypotheses  verified  in  Floridi’s  recently proposed  realistic 
neologisms of inforgs, infosphere, e-nvironmentalism, and hyperhistory. Following Plutarch’s 
literature model of “parallel lives,” the description of an earlier and a more recent persona’s 
common virtues, I juxtapose the works of the two authors. Through that, their “virtues” are 
mutually  verified  and  proven  diachronic.  I  also  hold  that  because  of  his  philosophical 
approaches  to  information-oriented  subjects,  Flusser  deserves  a  place  in  the  history  of 
Philosophy  of  Information,  and  subsequently,  that  building  an  interdisciplinary  bridge 
between philosophies of Information and Communication would be fruitful for the further 
development of both fields.
1 Introduction
It  is  probably  true  quite  generally  that  in  the  history  of  human  thinking  the  most  fruitful  
developments frequently take place at those points where two different lines of thought meet. 
These lines may have their roots in quite different parts of human culture, in different times or  
different cultural environments or different religious traditions: hence if they actually meet, that 
is, if they are at least so much related to each other that a real interaction can take place, then one  
may hope that new and interesting developments may follow. (Heisenberg, 2000, p. 129)
Communication can be conceived as the exchange of information and information can be 
conceived  as  the  main  source  of  communication.  Information  and  Communication 
Technologies  (ICT’s)  are  the  technologies  that  bring  the  two  concepts  technically  – 
theoretically and practically – near to each other. Vilém Flusser (1920-1991) and Luciano 
Floridi (1964-) are two figures that have brought them near philosophically. The former has 
mostly been associated to fields of media theory and has been described as a “philosopher of 
communication”  (Finger  et  al,  2011,  p.  xviii).  The  latter  is  known for  his  work  on  the 
philosophy  of  technology  and  computing  and  has  coined  the  term  “Philosophy  of 
Information” (PI,  Floridi,  2011, p.  13-17).  Both authors have written about history,  more 
specifically on its transcendence. One names it posthistory, one calls it hyperhistory1. Both 
attribute this transcendence to ICT’s development. 
Greek/Roman historian Plutarch wrote a series of books under the general title “Parallel 
Lives.” Each of them contains a pair of biographies of a Roman and an earlier Greek persona 
of historical importance, emphasizing on their common virtues (Duff, 1999, p. 2-3). Here, I 
borrow  this  scheme  of  analogy,  drawing  parallels  on  common  “virtues”  between  the 
aforementioned philosophers.  Paraphrasing the entry for “Parallel  Lives” in the Merriam-
Webster’s Encyclopedia of Literature (1995), by comparing Flusser and Floridi, I intend to 
emphasize on the patterns of behavior, commonly traced in the works of the two, and to 
encourage a fruitful dialogue between the philosophy of communication and the PI. 
Floridi recognizes the origins of PI in the works of several authors, even the ones that 
escape the philosophical theories of information and communication sciences. As he notices, 
“it  is  perfectly legitimate  to  speak of  PI  even in  authors  who lived  centuries  before  the 
information  revolution.  It  will  be fruitful  to  develop a  historical  approach and trace PI’s 
diachronic evolution” (Floridi,  2011, p. 15). I hold that Flusser stands as a unique recent 
exemplar  for  PI’s  diachronicity,  as  his  work  pinpoints  to  topics-of-the-day for  the  field, 
despite  his  accidental  exception  from  the  field’s  literature.  Hence,  this  paper  may  be 
considered a paradox: a historical approach to the works of two authors defending history’s 
abandonment, as a solid defense of a non-historical standpoint. Yet, the paradox is solved 
easily: History is not excluded from post- or hyperhistory – only the opposite is valid. Being 
hyper- or posthistorically permits the usage of historical, even prehistorical elements. More 
than a vertical continuity in PI’s  continuity in time, this paper aims showing a horizontal 
continuity of PI in disciplines towards communication and media studies, where Flusser is 
mostly studied. Flusser's engagement with PI topics before PI's emergence functions as an 
extra verification for PI's realism. PI topics as expressed through Floridi belong to the sphere 
of a realistic approach to information. The same subjects expressed through Flusser belong to 
the sphere of a hypothetical view to the future of communication. Now, that the two meet. 
this paper is addressed to information and communication researchers aiming at a unified 
(hyper/post)historical point of view towards current open problems in PI and communication 
and media studies. 
1.1 Methodology – Background – Scope
The main analysis is divided into five chapters based on the common themes found in the two 
authors’ oeuvre.  Chapter  2 sets  the basic  moral  shift  of the opposition “good vs evil”  to 
“information vs entropy” within informational environments that call for IE. Chapter 3 is 
describes  the  ontology  of  this  environments’ moral  agents,  called  functionaries/inforgs. 
Chapter 4 describes hyper- and posthistory, and their impact on time and space perception, as 
well  as the differentiation between hyper/posthistorical and historical societies.  Chapter 5 
explores what information oriented ecological modes of behavior the two authors suggest. 
1 See Vlieghe (2013) for a remark on the similarity between Flusser and Floridi's “hyper/post-histories.
Finally Chapter 6 presents their  commonality of themes when treating the ludic mode of 
behavior, and also their disagreement in its interpretation.
In respect to historical sequence,  Flusser has been prioritized to Floridi.  The reader is 
encouraged to read a fictitious “discussion” between the authors where Floridi provides with 
fresh replies to Flusser’s prophetic theses. The “parallel lives” paradigm aims at leaving a 
taste of unification to the reader. Drawing parallels is the base for starting a dialogue, as when 
proposing  “friendships”  in  social  networks  based  on  common  interests  after  a  common 
pattern recognition. I am not scholastically introducing or comparing the two authors' oeuvre. 
I emphasize on their commonalities to open a path that I believe should be opened a long 
time ago. Strictly speaking: to my knowledge the two philosophies never overlapped in the 
literature, only surrounding aspects of them in terms of theory or reference. That's why I don't 
include any previous work on the topic. The aim is to philosophize fruitfully using seeds from 
two distant, but – as I aim showing – complementary disciplines. 
2 Information contra Entropy 
The  dialogue  between  Flusser  and  Floridi  begins  by  setting  the  fundamental  values 
constituting their philosophies’ ethical horizons: information and entropy. Flusser usually first 
approaches “information” etymologically and then emphasizes on the meaning-giving aspect 
of information as a gesture of “culture” opposing “nature.” Flusser is aware of the many 
different  theories  information  has  been  approached  with  and  begins  one  of  his  essays 
provocatively based on that fact:
Although to inform originally meant to ‘dig forms into something,’ it has taken on a whole 
series of additional meanings in the present (and, in this way, it has become a term that people 
use to torment one another). Still, all these meanings have a common denominator: ‘the more  
improbable, the more informative.’
Information is  the  mirror  image  of  entropy,  the  reverse  of  the  tendency of  all  objects  (the 
objective world as a whole) to decay into more and more probable situations and finally into a  
formless, extremely probable situation. (Flusser, 1987, p. 12) 
Perfect communication is for Flusser the ideal information transmission (a discourse), that 
generates the novel information generation (a dialogue) (1983b p. 52-53). To accumulate and 
produce  information  becomes  the  purpose  of  life.  “Human  communication  is  an  artistic 
technique  whose  intention  it  is  to  make  us  forget  the  brutal  meaninglessness  of  a  life 
condemned to death” (2002, p. 4). Any sort of biological decay is perceived as an inescapable 
aspect of entropy. Any sort of meaning-giving is an aspect of life, an instance of information, 
that humans understand as human. Yet, information is there in nature, and humans perceive it 
in terms of biological structures, as the :tendency toward ever more complex forms, toward 
an  accumulation  of  information—as a  process  that  leads  to  more  improbable  structures” 
(Flusser, 2002, p. 5-6).
It  all  returns to information structures that oscillate  between high and low probability, 
entropy/negentropy and degrees of informativeness. And since information processes are not 
apparent  only  in  human  functions,  then  the  environment  can  be  explained  in  terms  of 
information. Flusser saw the turn from hard things to soft “ware” as an environmental shift:  
“The environment is becoming ever, softer, more nebulous, more ghostly, and to find one’s 
way around it one has to take this spectral nature as a starting point” (Flusser, 1999, p. 87). 
Turning to Floridi, his deep knowledge of discussions on information lead him to present a 
unified  General  Definition  of  Information  (GDI)  echoing  the  semantic  approach  that 
perceives information as the addition of meaning to the raw material of data: 
GDIσ (an infon) is an instance of semantic information if and only if: 
GDI.1 σ consists of n data (d), for n ≥ 1;
GDI.2 the data are well-formed (wfd);
GDI.3 the wfd are meaningful (mwfd = δ) (Floridi, 2011, p. 84)
Floridi and Flusser follow parallel paths. To produce information is to add meaning to data 
and in order to do that, the data have to be well-formed, that is of more complex structures.  
The  degrees  of  form  of  structures  recognized  in  nature  beyond  biosphere,  animate  or 
inanimate, make the preservation of information a prerequisite for the preservation of life. 
Thus, Floridi suggests the intelligent entities’ ontological migration into the “Infosphere,” his 
neologism  that  “denotes  the  whole  informational  environment  constituted  by  all 
informational  entities  (thus  including  informational  agents  as  well),  their  properties, 
interactions, processes, and mutual relations” (Floridi, 2007, p. 59). “Being” becomes equal 
with “carrying information” as the latter is defined above. His IE is based on the ethical 
division between (1) existence, that is carrying information, being a “being,” and (2) non-
existence, that is entropy, “absence or negation of any information”, being a “non-being.” By 
entropy he defines the indication of information degradation “leading to the absence of form, 
pattern, differentiation or content in the infosphere” (Floridi, 1999, p. 44).  Information and 
entropy are straightforwardly opposed to  each other by Floridi’s  four basic norms for IE 
where within the infosphere “information entropy ought not to be caused,” “ought to be prevented,” 
and “ought to be removed” (Floridi, 1999, p. 47).
Flusser treats nature as processes of information,  and foresees a “softer” informational 
environment.  Floridi  treats  the recognition of  information processes as the new “nature,” 
proposing the “infosphere.”  The struggle against  entropy in such an environment renders 
their  paths  parallel.  In  addition  to  that,  Flusser  had  his  very  own  interpretation  of 
thermodynamical  entropy,  that  meant  practically  the  natural  degradation  of  information 
clearly distinguishing his unique view from physical or Shannonian entropy, just like Floridi 
does when defending his metaphysical entropy, or non-beingness as an opposition to Being 
(2008b, p. 44-45).
3 Functionaries/Inforgs
The aforementioned informational organisms are in Floridian terms called “inforgs.” This 
chapter draws the parallel between these creatures and the Flusserian notion of “functionary.” 
Both terms imply the symmetrization process between humans and computers/robots. For 
Flusser, an abstract notion of the “factory” produces new forms of tools for humans, thus 
reshaping  the  very  human  being  in  return  in  a  McLuhanesque  sense  of  human/tools 
reflection:  “Factories  are  places  in  which  new kinds  of  human  beings  are  always  being 
produced: first the hand-man, then the tool-man, then the machine-man, and finally the robot-
man. To repeat: This is the history of humankind” (Flusser, 1999, p. 44-45). Floridi holds the 
same argument for technology’s impact on “being”, when using the terms “re-engineering” 
and  “re-ontologizing”:  “Now,  ICTs  are  not  augmenting  or  empowering  in  the  sense  just 
explained. They are reontologizing devices because they engineer environments that the user 
is  then enabled to  enter  through (possibly friendly)  gateways.  It  is  a form of  initiation.” 
(Floridi, 2007, p. 62). Flusser’s “robot” could replace in certain occurrences Floridi’s “ICT’s” 
and “computers.” Flusser sees the robots as evolutionary results of machines where biological 
and neurophysiological theories and hypotheses have been applied to them (Flusser, 1999, p. 
46). As  hand tools evolve into machines and machines into robots, the reflection between 
human and device leads to a similarity of being and a mutual dependence:
[T]he relationship between human being and robot is reversible and [...] they can only function  
together: the human being in effect is the function of the robot, and by the same token the robot 
as a function of the human being. The robot only does what the human being wants, but the 
human being can only want what the robot can do. A new method of manufacturing – i.e. of 
functioning – is coming into being: The human being is a functionary of robots that function as  
a function of him. This new human being, the functionary, is linked to robots by thousands of 
partly invisible threads: Wherever he goes, stands or lies, he carries the robots around with him 
(or is carried around by them), and whatever he does or suffers can be interpreted as a function  
of the robot (Flusser, 1999, p. 47-48)
Jumping back to Floridi, “ICTs are not merely re-engineering but actually re-ontologizing 
our  world.  […]  Human-Computer  interaction  is  a  symmetric  relation”  (Floridi,  2010). 
Describing inforgs, he explains this symmetric relation as a relation of mutual dependence. 
One recognizes s/he is an inforg as soon as the dependence to ICT’s is obvious. In his words, 
placed next to Flusser’s:
One day, being an inforg will be so natural that any disruption in our normal flow of information 
will  make us sick. Even literally. […] Today, we know that our autonomy is limited by the 
energy bottleneck of our batteries. […] Google IRL (in real life) will signal the collapse of that 
thin membrane still separating the worlds of online and offline. […] If you spend more time  
connected than sleeping, you are an inforg (Floridi, 2007, p. 63)
This smoothing process verified by the two authors can be described like this: humans and 
their tools are separate. The development of ICT’s has made them more and more bonded, 
and as humans become more and more dependent on them they recognize themselves as 
functionaries or inforgs. The process gives space for another observation: Not only humans 
are dependent on ICT’s, but they behave more and more like artificial intelligences, while 
artificial intelligences function more and more like humans. At a certain point functionaries 
and inforgs could be either humans or computers, and the differentiation holds zero ethical 
value. Thus, the highest value, as stressed also in the previous chapter, remains on carrying 
information.  Flusser sees in Information Revolution a shift from industrial  things to non-
things that signifies a Nietzschean revaluation of all values. In Flusser’s worldplay non-things 
are things one cannot easily get hold of.  “Non-things now flood our environment from all 
directions, displacing things. These non-things are called ‘information’ [...] All things will 
lose  their  value,  and all  values  will  be transformed into information.  ‘Revaluation  of  all 
values’” (Flusser, 1999, p. 86, 88). Thus the “things,” animate or inanimate, carry no highest 
value such as “life,” or “possession.” The shift is a turn to the information they carry, and 
subsequently to their very existence: “Our existential concerns are shifting before our very 
eyes from things to information. We are less and less concerned with possessing things and 
more and more concerned with consuming information” (ibid, p. 87). These “concerns” about 
new “values” are confirmed through their acceptance as the basis of any ethical discourse in 
Floridi’s  IE:  “From  an  IE  perspective,  the  ethical  discourse  now  comes  to  concern 
information  as  such,  that  is  not  just  all  persons,  their  cultivation,  well-being  and  social 
interactions,  not  just  animals,  plants  and  their  proper  natural  life,  but  also  anything that 
exists” (Floridi, 1999, p. 43). 
The  main  ethical  discourse  between  information  and  entropy outlined  in  chapter  2  is 
sustained here as the main value attributed to the beings inhabiting the soft  environment, 
infosphere. The ontological shift has lead humans to function more as functions of robots and 
ICT’s, being categorized as either functionaries or inforgs. This whole process is taking place 
in the context of a so-called age of Information Revolution, causing a new perception in both 
time and space analyzed next.
4 Information Revolution, Topology of Hyper/Post-History: 
This  chapter  draws  the  parallels  between  Flusser  and  Floridi’s  analyses  of  information 
revolution and their coinciding conclusions for a new perception of transcended history and 
geography,  together  with  the  knowledge  that  this  perception  is  not  common universally. 
Starting by information revolution, the two authors follow some different paths leading to the 
same “revolution.” For Flusser information revolution is the most recent rung of a chain that 
describes humans’ relation with their tools, a relation that breeds existential evolution : “As 
soon as a tool – e.g. a hand-axe – is introduced, one can speak of a new form of existence” 
(Flusser, 1999, p. 45). The first rung is the agricultural or first industrial revolution, where 
humans create small tools surrounding them. The second was the known industrial revolution 
or, for Flusser, the second industrial revolution, where huge machines are invented and placed 
in the center of attention with humans surrounding them (ibid, p. 45-46). “Previously the tool 
was the variable and the human being the constant, subsequently the human being became the 
variable and the machine the constant. Previously the tool functioned as a function of the 
human being, subsequently the human being as a function of the machine” (1983a, 23-24). 
Flusser then pictures how the future humans, functionaries of information revolution, or the 
third  industrial  revolution,  will  cope  with  their  new  tools  “equipped  with  tiny  or  even 
invisible robots will be engaged in manufacture all the time and everywhere” (Flusser, 1999, 
48). Given the fact he was writing in the mid-80’s, his predictions are quite precise, sounding 
almost prophetic: “Thanks to robots, everyone will be linked to everyone else everywhere and  
all the time by reversible cable, and via these cables (as well as the robots) they will turn to 
use everything available to be turned into something and thus turned into account” (Ibid, p. 
48, emphasis added). Floridi’s philosophy verifies Flusser’s from his realistic point of view. 
What Flusser was foreseeing then has happened now, in  terms of being local  and global 
simultaneously through interrelation.
Floridi  agrees  with  Flusser  on  the  axiom  that  “science”  or  “tools”  in  Flusserian 
terminology  does  not  affect  only  humanity’s  epistemological  standpoint,  but  also  the 
ontological, or in his words “two fundamental ways of changing our understanding. One may 
be called extrovert, or about the world, and the other introvert, or about ourselves” (Floridi, 
2009, p. 9). The “revolutionary” path he follows is different from Flusser’s as he considers 
information  revolution  as  the  Fourth  Revolution,  in  the  sequence  of  another  three 
groundbreaking  scientific  advancements  that  have  shifted  our  ontological  position  in  the 
universe. These three have verified that “we are not immobile, at the centre of the universe 
(Copernican revolution), we are not unnaturally separate and diverse from the rest of the 
animal kingdom (Darwinian revolution), and we are very far from being Cartesian minds 
entirely  transparent  to  ourselves  (Freudian  revolution)”  (ibid,  p.  10). This  shift  of 
transparency  leads  to  a  fourth  shift,  described  in  the  previous  chapters,  the  shift  to 
information  environment,  the  infosphere,  and  the  humans  new positioning  in  regards  to 
ICT’s. The appearance of inforgs signifies the Floridian informational Fourth Revolution that 
in other cases coincides with the Flusserian sequence of agricultural and industrial ones, not 
only in terminology but also in its dramatic impact on locality, synchronicity, and interactions 
in social structures and architectural environments: “As a consequence of such reontologization 
of  our  ordinary environment,  we  shall  be  living  in  an  infosphere  that  will  become  increasingly 
synchronized (time), delocalized (space), and correlated (interactions)” (Floridi, 2007, p. 8, emphasis 
added, cf with previous emphasis).
For  both  authors  this  dramatic  change  has  an  impact  on  the  perception  of  historical 
processes. In fact, both agree that “history” as a term should be abandoned and replaced by 
one that signifies its transcendence. In Flusserian, the proper term is “posthistory.” History 
functioned as a one-dimensional line of events succeeding one another by the laws of cause 
and effect. Computational logic breaks this line, leading to “a new, dimensionless level, one 
to be called, for lack of a more positive designation, ‘posthistory.’ The rules that once sorted 
the  universe  into  processes,  concepts  into  judgments,  are  dissolving.  The  universe  is 
disintegrating  into  quanta,  judgments  into  bits  of  information”  (Flusser,  1985,  p.  15). 
Information  revolution  signifies  for  Flusser  a  passage  from  the  material  values  to  the 
immaterial ones, due to the very nature of information. These immaterial forms are getting 
things delocalized, leading to a negation of geographical space in favor of topological place 
(in Greek: topos) , and a rethinking of values. He proposes that posthistory does not only give 
an end to history but also geography:
Strangely, a rethinking in terms of topology rather than geography will not make the city to be 
designed “utopic.” It  is “utopic” (placeless) as long as we continue to think geographically,  
because it cannot be localized within a geographical place. But, as soon as we are able to think 
topologically—that is, in terms of networked concrete relationships—the city to be designed 
allows not only localization, but also localization everywhere in the network.” (Flusser, 2002, p. 
177)
Thus, the “forthcoming” form of the city seems utopic, but a topological rethinking will 
help grounding “topics” of interests, places. Flusser’s u-topic nature of posthistory includes a 
political comment as well, since politics in the usual sense are to be abandoned in the new 
topological treatment of the city (Greek: polis, that gives origin to politics). Floridi holds the 
similar views for the ICT’s impact on politics when stating that “ICTs fluidify the topology of 
politics.  ICTs do not merely enable but actually promote the agile,  temporary and timely 
aggregation, disaggregation and re-aggregation of distributed groups around shared interests 
across  old,  rigid  boundaries,  represented  by  social  classes,  political  parties,  ethnicity, 
language barriers,  and so forth.”  (Floridi,  2013b,  p.  6).  Like a  straight  reply to  Flusser's 
criticism on  “u-topic,”  he  rather  prefers  “atopic”  as  an  adjective  to  the  environment  of 
infosphere:  “The infosphere,  often  equated  to  its  most  prominent,  digital  region,  namely 
cyberspace, is not a geographical, political, social, or linguistic space. It is the atopic space of  
mental life, from education to science, from cultural expressions to communication, from 
trade to recreation” (2002a, p. 2). Floridi uses the term “hyperhistory” to describe the modus 
vivendi of inforgs in societies vitally dependent on ICT’s. The passage below is a thorough 
explanation of what makes hyperhistorical societies:
Prehistory and history work like adverbs: they tell us how people live, not when or where. From 
this  perspective,  human  societies  currently  stretch  across  three  ages,  as  ways  of  living.  
According to reports [...] there are still some societies that live prehistorically, without ICTs or 
at  least  without  recorded  documents.  [...]  The  greatest  majority  of  people  today  still  live 
historically,  in  societies  that  rely on ICTs to  record and transmit  data of all  kinds.  In  such 
historical societies, ICTs have not yet overtaken other technologies, especially energy-related 
ones, in terms of their vital importance. Then, there are some people around the world who are 
already  living  hyperhistorically,  in  societies  or  environments  where  ICTs  and  their  data 
processing  capabilities  are  the  necessary  condition  for  the  maintenance  and  any  further 
development  of  societal  welfare,  personal  well-being,  as  well  as  intellectual  flourishing. 
(Floridi, 2012b, p. 129-130)
Floridi not only claims that a hyperhistorical way of living already takes place, but also 
indicates a global dysrhythmia in what historical model different societies use. The different 
degrees of historical perception are noted also by Flusser, that, for his time, uses the industrial 
paradigm as a constant for separating the societies. For Flusser the posthistory is signified by 
a “linguistic” shift, where historical linear codes are replaced by digital computer codes. Still, 
as marked earlier by Floridi, places in the world keep going “prehistorically,” are “illiterate” 
and non-industrialized:
The transition from the industrial society to the post-industrial is being processed in the so-
called ‘developed’ world. Simultaneously,  the largest part of humanity is undergoing several 
progressive phases of industrialization. In the ‘First World,’ linear, historical thought, which is 
founded on texts, is being challenged by a thinking that is structured by post-textual codes, by  
technical images. In the ‘Third World,’ efforts are being made to increase adult literacy. (Flusser, 
1983b, p. 159) 
The  following  excerpts  appear  as  a  fictitious  dialogue  between  the  two regarding the 
generation gap between contemporary people and the next generations:
Flusser: “We are closer to a worker or citizen of the time of the French Revolution than to  
our children – yes, those children playing with electronic gadgets. Of course, this parallel 
may not make the current revolution any less unsettling, but it may help us to get a hold on  
things” (1999, p. 88)
Floridi: “In fifty years, our grandchildren may look at us as the last of the historical, State-
run generations, not so differently from the way we look at the Amazonian tribes, as the last  
of the prehistorical,  stateless societies. It  may take a long while before we shall come to 
understand in full such transformations, but it is time to start working on it.” (2012b, p. 131)
Summing up this chapter’s parallel lines: Information revolution can be perceived as the 
sequential  result  of  two  chains  that  end  in  the  same  rung:  agricultural  and  industrial 
revolutions  as  well  as  the  Copernican,  Darwinian,  Freudian  ones  all  end  up  to  what  is 
recognized as information revolution, that is the technological revolution of ICT’s that has 
affected not only our scientific and epistemological knowledge, but also our ontological and 
existential  position  and  standpoint.  Our  position  is  founded  in  an  immaterial,  mental 
environment  of  information,  the  infosphere,  that  is  atopic/utopian,  non-political  in  the 
historical sense of the word, delocalized and synchronized. The networked delocalization and 
synchronization causes a new perception of transcended history, hyper/posthistory. Still, this 
perception is only available to societies that are completely dependent on the usage of ICT’s. 
Several other places on Earth live still under the rules of history, and even prehistory. Both 
Flusser and Floridi verify that future generations will perceive us – their historical ancestors – 
as we perceive our prehistorical ones. 
5 Nature/Culture – e-nvironmentalism. 
Another point of agreement between the two authors is the call for an ecological standpoint 
when  it  comes  to  information  processes.  Since  they  both  suggest  the  acceptance  of  an 
information  environment  as  the  current  main  environment,  it’s  quite  probable  that  the 
development of an ecological consciousness would appear in their texts. As shown in chapter 
2, they both base their ethical philosophy on the opposition between information and entropy. 
Information forms the Being, generating structures, relations, and meaning. Entropy destroys 
the Being naturally, it’s a form of a natural cycle apparent to all objects when examined under 
the information scope. Flusser’s worldview on history consists of the humans’ struggle for 
taming  nature,  a  process  called  culture.  To  him,  culture  means  to  add  meaning  to  the 
meaningless nature, to impose information onto it. The more informational “culture” remains, 
the less entropic “nature.” 
[M]an  produces,  stores,  and  transmits  new  information.  He  increases  the  sum  of 
available information. That is what history is. This contradicts the second principle of 
thermodynamics, which affirms the progressive decrease of the sum of all information 
within  a  closed  system  (the  world).  History,  as  a  dam  for  new  information  is 
antinatural. (Flusser, 1983b, p. 51-52) 
Yet,  stored  redundant  information  can  be  harmful.  Flusser  developed  the  following 
prediction based on his time’s ecology issues. While in the historical, industrial times the 
cycle of information generation/degradation  was halted at “waste” (like plastic bottles), in 
posthistory,  the  process  is  halted  into  culture,  causing  the  –  then  –  new  problem  of 
information flood. Flusser outlines the problem and already proposes a general philosophical 
and educational model of forgetting as a necessary supplement to the one of learning:
It  will,  on the other  hand,  present  another,  equally threatening problem.  For  if  the  circular 
pattern  nature–culture–waste–nature  begins  to  stall  at  culture  rather  than  at  waste,  we  will  
require  a  vast  store  for  culture  to  provide  storage  for  the  flood  of  incoming  information. 
Otherwise we will suffocate from a surfeit of information rather than of waste. It is already 
possible to see, in rough outline, what such a cultural reconstruction would look like. First,  
increasingly efficient artificial memories will be integrated into the culture. Second, the concept 
of “forgetting” will have to acquire a new and fully adjustable meaning. Forgetting must achieve 
equal status with learning and be recognized as equally critical to information strategy. (Flusser, 
1985, p. 109-110)
Again he meets his match and prophecy fulfillment in Floridi’s in-depth analysis. Living 
hyperhistorically  invites  among others  “a new philosophy of  nature”  and “a synthetic  e-
nvironmentalism as a bridge between us and the world” (Floridi, 2012b, p. 130-131). While 
Flusser sees “nature” and “culture” as a nodes of the information cycle, Floridi proposes the 
marriage of “physis and technē” (Greek for nature and technique/art, 2010, p. 119) through 
their very dissolving process naturally/culturally accepted in the proposed mode of behavior 
for inforgs: “information is both the raw material we produce and manipulate and the finished 
good we consume.” In this sense “hyperhistorical society is a neo-manufacturing society” 
(Floridi, 2013a, p. 250). Apart from the environmental basics that have been discussed in 
earlier chapters, Floridi also rings the same bell with Flusser in regards to the information 
overload,  nowadays  rediscovered  as  “Big  Data.”  He  first  announces  the  effects  of  the 
problem in numbers: “It is estimated that humanity accumulated 180 EB of data between the 
invention of writing and 2006. Between 2006 and 2011, the total grew ten times and reached 
1,600 EB” (Floridi, 2012a, p. 435). He then names the problem: “We have shifted from the 
problem of what to save to the problem of what to erase. Something must be deleted or never  
be  recorded.  Think  of  your  smart  phone  becoming  too  full  because  you  took  too  many 
pictures, and make it a global problem. The infosphere run out of memory space to dump its 
data years ago” (ibid, p. 437). Finally he directs towards the conceptualization of an info-eco-
friendly mindset as a solution to the problem: We should “know which data may be useful 
and relevant,  and hence  worth collecting  and curating,  in  order  to  exploit  their  valuable 
patterns. We need more and better techniques and technologies to see the small data patterns, 
but  we need more  and better  epistemology to  sift  the  valuable  ones”  (ibid  p.  437).  His 
ecological approach on information has also lead him to the development of the internal RPT 
model, where moral agents and informational objects are treated equally in the environment 
where information can be found as a resource, as a product, and as a target (RPT). Moral 
agents  come with the  duty to  “consider  the  whole  information-cycle  (including creation, 
elaboration,  distribution,  storage,  protection,  usage  and  possible  destruction)”  for  a 
sustainable environment (2006, p. 4-10).
Mixing Flusser and Floridi’s ecological suggestions, one extracts that natural, meaningless 
data are transformed into cultural  meaningful information.  As long as there is no time to 
process either automatically produced data or information, a new form of waste is apparent in 
the infosphere, analogous to the pollution in the biosphere. The new mentality invoked by the 
two authors includes a know-how that accepts both generation and destruction, and calls for 
an ecological education based not only in production and consumption but also deletion.  
6 Game Theory – Interpretations of Homo Ludens: 
Here  comes the  final  parallel  line,  a  point  of  simultaneous  agreement  and disagreement. 
Flusser and Floridi have their last meeting point when game-theoretic terms are preferred to 
explain information processes and relations within informational environments. Yet, in their 
dialogue they disagree on the usage of Johan Huizinga’s (1955) term “Homo Ludens,” the 
playing human. 
Flusser proposes that the forthcoming society’s prevailing “theory” “will very probably be 
a game strategy. We already have a whole series of disciplines that are ‘theories’ in this new 
meaning of the term: informatics, cybernetics and decision theory to mention only a few 
examples” (Flusser,  1983b, p.  34).  Flusser treats  “gaming” and “playing” like synonyms. 
Then, if  computers are games,  played with keyboards,  and game-theoretic terms describe 
them, fictitious games become the concrete reality, with no “reality” behind them. This mode 
of playing behavior is represented by the Homo Ludens, where play is made purely for play, 
not for a one-side victory. Winning games in posthistory does not represent earning benefits 
such as in the phrase “war games.” Some excerpts from Flusser's game-theoretic approach to 
play:
The  symbolic  games  of  which  we  take  part  do  not  represent  any  universe  of  concrete 
experience, but on the contrary, this concrete experience represents games. We live our concrete  
experience in function of games. Games are our ontological ground and all future ontology is 
necessarily game theory. (Flusser, 1983b, p. 105-106)
Elsewhere, he even claims that “we are programmed to be Homines ludentes,” and he puts his 
own explanation of “functionaries” under criticism, claiming that this playful spirit will help 
overcoming complete robotization and objectification, as we “may, equally, be players that 
play in function of the Other” (1983b, p. 166). 
In my fictitiously set-up dialogue of the two authors Floridi now disrupts Flusser, holding that 
the ludic, playful behavior in the infosphere might be ecologically harmful. For Floridi, moral 
agents should be demiurgic prosumers that respect the environment. They hold responsibility 
for all three aspects of the RPT model, and thus the ludic  Homo Ludens model should be 
abandoned due to its lack of awareness as long as play is just for play. He then proposes 
another term for this new inforgian human species:
Homo  poieticus is  to  be  distinguished  from  homo  faber,  user  and  “exploitator”  of  natural 
resources, from  homo oeconomicus,  producer, distributor, and consumer of wealth, and from 
homo ludens (Huizinga [1970]), who embodies a leisurely playfulness devoid of the ethical care 
and responsibility characterising the constructionist attitude. Homo poieticus is a demiurge who 
takes care of reality to protect it and make it flourish. (20062, p. 23) 
Other than that, he considers game-theoretic approaches to Computer Ethics appropriate 
(1999, p. 41) and for “the sake of simplicity, and following current trends” presents economic 
information  “framed  in  game-theoretic  terms”  in  even  greater  detail  than  Flusser,  when 
introducing shortly “complete,” “asymmetric,” “perfect,” and “Bayesian” information (2010). 
All  these  forms  of  game-theoretic  approaches  to  information,  though  share  nothing with 
Homo Ludens.
Here the main opposition is found –  nonetheless justified by the generation gap between 
the  authors.  As  said  above,  Flusser’s  philosophy  of  posthistorical  ludic  behavior  is 
hypothetical,  a  sort  of  mellontological  prognostics  –  with  a  sense  of  optimism.  Floridi 
proposes that the playful mindset of Homo Ludens tested within a game-theoretic framework 
is incompatible with a clear ethical and ecological viewpoint in the information environment. 
Rightfully, it should be replaced by his Homo Poieticus, a behavior model that includes the 
previously mentioned “know-how” of the demiurge, with respect to the environment, causing 
no  entropic  harm  to  the  infosphere.  Still,  no  matter  their  difference,  their  common 
engagement with both Huizinga’s and the game-theoretic terms adds to the exploration of the 
authors’ common “virtues.” 
7 Conclusions
Posthistorians, people who tell a story about the end of history, are necessarily storytellers. When 
they tell a story about the end of history, they make history. It seems as if they are caught up in a  
sophistic paradox, like someone who speaks about the end of philosophy and then, with this  
philosophical pronouncement, drives philosophy forward. (Flusser, 2002, p. 143-144)
Flusser and Floridi now can function as complementary manifestations of a tested hypothesis, 
which has been proven correct to most of its consisting parts. To certain extents, Floridi’s 
proposals seem like replies to Flusser’s questions. To other extents they seem like perfect 
matches, or developed versions. Flusser’s terms describe a forthcoming form of existence a 
priori.  It’s a hypothetical view of the future world partially realized at  his time. Floridi’s 
terms describe a worldview of a realized form of existence a posteriori. It’s a realistic view of 
the current world. Summing up, Flusser’s playful posthistorical functionaries function as a 
2 See also Floridi's (1999, 40-41) treatment of hackers as an example of ludic behavior causing damage in the 
infosphere.
preview  of  Floridi’s  hyperhistorical  inforgs.  The  two  notions  bare  same  elements.  New 
technologies (“ICT’s,” “robots,” “computers”) mark the information revolution, giving space 
to  these  new modes  of  existence,  with ontological  and existential  impacts.  What  is  now 
perceived as  nature/environment  is  sustained through the  ethical  rules  of  the information 
game. Flusser was only descriptive about this informational environment. Floridi thoroughly 
analyzes its elements, and names it infosphere. Both ring the bell for an ecological approach 
to  the information cycle.  Flusser  foresaw the problem. Floridi  brings the evidence.  From 
these parallels drawn here, both authors’ works are benefitted. Flusser gets his theories tested 
and  verified  by  current  observations.  Floridi’s  proposed  terminology  discovers  a 
hyper/posthistorical ancestor. 
Hence, Flusser deserves a place in the PI pantheon, and this paper proposes the study of 
his work with emphasis on information-theoretical terms as a vital tool for future PI studies. 
By the same token, it’s time for Floridi’s neologisms to be considered eventually less “new,” 
getting  their  rightful  place  in  the  sphere  of  common  sense,  rather  than  the  one  of 
“neologisms,” while his analysis of ICT's should be considered within communication and 
media studies contexts as well. 
This paper’s conclusions aim also to be conceived as a networking bridge linking diverse 
audiences from distinct fields where the works of the two authors have occasionally been 
used  –  mostly  fields  of  information  and  communication  theories.  An  interdisciplinary 
discussion  between  these  fields  starting  by  the  mingle  of  Flusser  and  Floridi’s  already 
interdisciplinary  spirit,  can  be  proven  more  than  fruitful  for  the  further  theoretical 
development  of  those  fields.  Sticking  to  words,  ICT’s  include  both  “information”  and 
“communication.” Flusser and Floridi’s theoretical harmonious balance does not only imply 
parallels for the sake of scholasticism. It’s a message of diachronicity of hyper/posthistory.
More than that. Abstracting the contents of this paper, I propose the unifying perception of 
two  gestures,  one  of  information  and  one  of  communication.  The  informative  gesture 
generates  new  meaning  from  given  communicated  signals.  The  communicative  gesture 
preserves  the  meaning  acquired  by  informing  sources.  Information  studies  are  in 
complementarity with communication studies,  in  a yin and yang relation with rhizomatic 
structure within the inner sub-fields. Whether philosophy is the “first science” or not, it is of 
key importance to bridge information and communication studies on their philosophical level, 
as a set ground for further potential philosophical investigations between the disciplines: Let 
McLuhan be in dialogue with Dretske, or de Saussure negotiate with Peirce. Let the common 
conclusions  of  Flusser  and  Floridi  flourish  as  a  fruit  of  interdisciplinarity,  and  let 
“information” and “communication” become particles of a fruitful dialectic. 
In hyper/posthistory variations of the same coexist in both space and time, like a digital 
picture of a painting taken with a camera of yesteryear's technology and one of the same 
painting  taken with  the  best  available  resolution of  today.  Parallel  lives  like  the  ones  of 
Flusser  and  Floridi,  imply  coexisting  parallel  universes  –  and  Plutarch  gets  quantum-
theoretically refreshed, having his method verified in the words of Heisenberg quoted in the 
beginning of this article.
References 
Duff, T. (1999). Plutarch's Lives: exploring virtue and vice. Oxford University Press.
Finger,  A.  K.,  Guldin,  R.,  & Bernardo,  G.  (2011).  Vilém Flusser:  An Introduction. 
University of Minnesota Press.
Floridi,  L.  (1999).  Information  ethics:  on the  philosophical  foundation of  computer 
ethics. Ethics and information technology, 1(1), 33-52.
Floridi, L. (2002a). Information ethics: an environmental approach to the digital divide. 
Philosophy in the Contemporary World, 9(1), 39-45.
Floridi,  L.  (2002b).  On  Defining  Library  and  Information  Science  as  Applied 
Philosophy of Information. Social epistemology, 16(1), 37-49.
Floridi, L. (2004). LIS as Applied Philosophy of Information: A Reappraisal.
Floridi, L. (2006). Information ethics, its nature and scope.  ACM SIGCAS Computers  
and Society, 35(2), 3-3.
Floridi, L. (2007). A look into the future impact of ICT on our lives. The information 
society, 23(1), 59-64.
Floridi, L. (2008a). Artificial Intelligence’s new frontier: Artificial Companions and the 
Fourth Revolution. Metaphilosophy 39. 4/5: 652-654.
Floridi,  L.  (2008b).  Information  ethics:  A  reappraisal.  Ethics  and  Information  
Technology, 10(2), 189-204.
Floridi,  L.  (2009).  The Information  Society and its  Philosophy:  Introduction  to  the 
Special  Issue  on  “the  Philosophy  of  Information,  its  Nature,  and  Future 
Developments”. The Information Society, 25(3), 153-158.
Floridi, L. (2010). Information: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Floridi, L. (2011). The Philosophy of Information. New York: Oxford University Press.
Floridi,  L.  (2012a).  Big  data  and  their  epistemological  challenge.  Philosophy  & 
Technology, 1-3.
Floridi,  L.  (2012b).  Hyperhistory  and  the  Philosophy  of  Information  Policies. 
Philosophy & Technology, 129-131.
Floridi,  L.  (2013a).  E-ducation  and  the  Languages  of  Information.  Philosophy  & 
Technology, 26, 247-251.
Floridi, L. (2013b). Hyperhistory and the Philosophy of Information Policies.  In: The 
Onlife Initiative. Retrieved 04-05-2014 from 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/Contribution_Floridi.pdf
Flusser, V. (1979, 2013). Natural:Mind. Minneapolis: Univocal.
Flusser, V. (1983a, 2000). Towards a Philosophy of Photography. London: Reaktion.
Flusser, V. (1983b, 2013). Post-History. Minneapolis: Univocal.
Flusser,  V.  (1985,  2011).  Into  the  Universe  of  Technical  Images.  Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press.
Flusser,  V.  (1987,  2011).  Does Writing  Have a Future? Minneapolis:  University of 
Minnesota Press.
Flusser, V. (1999). The Shape of Things: A Philosophy of Design. London: Reaktion.
Flusser, V. (2002). Writings. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Flusser, V. (2003). The freedom of the migrant: Objections to nationalism. University of 
Illinois Press.
Heisenberg, W. (2000). Physics and philosophy. London: Penguin.
Huizinga, Johan (1955). Homo ludens; a study of the play-element in culture. Boston: 
Beacon Press.
Vlieghe,  J.  (2013).  Education  in  an  Age  of  Digital  Technologies.  Philosophy  & 
Technology, 1-19.
